#NOTION IDEAS FREE#

if their reality corresponds to their notion. These objects are true, if they are as they ought to be, i.e. It is in this deeper sense of truth that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion. This is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness it is formal truth, bare correctness. Truth is at first taken to mean that I know how something is. It would be an abstract form, only if the notion, which is its principle, were taken as an abstract unity, and not as the negative return of it into self and as the subjectivity which it really is.

#NOTION IDEAS FREE#

It is abstract certainly, in so far as everything untrue is consumed in it: but in its own self it is essentially concrete, because it is the free notion giving character to itself, and that character, reality. It is no less false to imagine the Idea to be mere abstraction. Such a view must be abandoned to those theories which ascribe so-called reality and genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. As issued out of this ‘judgment’ the Idea is in the first place only the one universal substance: but its developed and genuine actuality is to be as a subject and in that way as mind.īecause it has no existence for starting-point and point d’appui, the Idea is frequently treated as a mere logical form.

The Absolute is the universal and one idea, which, by an act of ‘judgment’, particularises itself to the system of specific ideas which after all are constrained by their nature to come back to the one idea where their truth lies. The Idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of something or other, any more than the notion is to be taken as merely a specific notion.

It is this limitation of its existence which constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual. The individual by itself does not correspond to its notion. It is only in them altogether and in their relation that the notion is realised. Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea: for which, therefore, yet other actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have a self-subsistence of their own. And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. In the idea we have nothing to do with the individual, nor with figurate conceptions, nor with external things. The Idea is the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion - not of course the correspondence of external things with my conceptions, for these are only correct conceptions held by me, the individual person. All former definitions come back to this. The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself absolute. Its ‘ideal’ content is nothing but the notion in its detailed terms: its ‘real’ content is only the exhibition which the notion gives itself in the form of external existence, while yet, by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and so keeps itself in it. The Idea is truth in itself and for itself - the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity. Part One of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: The Logic Third Subdivision: The Notion The Doctrine of the Notion, 3rd Part: The Idea, Hegel

Notion ideas